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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent
vs
BRITTANY MICHELLE ACUNA,
Defend a nt/Appella nt.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 39678-2012

)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Honorable Robert C Naftz presiding.

Stephen G. Larsen
nd
155 S 2
Pocatello, Idaho 83201
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Lawrence G Wasden
Attorney General for Idaho
Statehouse Room 210
Boise, Idaho 83720
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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Statement of the Case

The Magistrate in the court below, and the District Judge thereafter, ordered
restitution to the State Insurance Fund after the Defendant/Appellant had
entered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor amended from an initial felony charge.
The change of plea was subject to a plea agreement whereby the Defendant
agreed to pay restitution solely in the form of the victim's out of pocket expenses.
After the entry of the Defendant's plea, and its acceptance by the District Judge,
the State submitted a claim for restitution on behalf of the State Insurance Fund.
Notwithstanding the language of the Plea Agreement, the Magistrate, on remand
ordered the restitution above and beyond that set forth in the plea agreement.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

On August 30,2010 Brittany Acuna was charged by criminal complaint with
Battery Upon a Law Enforcement Officer, I.C. 18-903(a) and 18-915(3)(b), Tr
69.70. She was accused of kicking officer Brown of the Pocatello Police
Department during a scuffle with her then-boyfriend, Christopher Bishop. Brittany
was also charged with misdemeanor Domestic Battery as a result of this incident.
Police Report, Tr 79 et seq.
Brittany waived her Preliminary Hearing before the Hon. Thomas Clark on
September 13, 2010, and entered a Not Guilty plea to the Information before the
Honorable Robert Naftz. The Defendant, through counsel, and the State through
Deputy Prosecutor, Ja Niece Price entered into and executed a written Plea
Agreement on March 31, 2011. That agreement is set forth beginning at Tr 109.
Defendant entered a plea of Guilty to misdemeanor Battery, and the case was
remanded to the Hon. Thomas Clark, Magistrate, for sentencing.
After remand, the State of Idaho, again through attorney Price, submitted claims
for restitution on behalf of the Idaho State Insurance Fund for monies expended
on behalf of Officer Brown, notwithstanding the language in Paragraph 4 of the
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Plea Agreement, Tr. 26-29. Judge Clark believed that such restitution was
mandated by the Victim's Compensation Act, and ordered Brittany pay $4500 to
the State Insurance Fund, Tr. 125, Transcript of Restitution Hearing 5. Defendant
appealed
The appeal was argued before District Judge Robert Naftz, and On January
30,2012 he issued a Memorandum Decision upholding the restitution order of
Judge Clark Tr. 45-56. This appeal followed.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. DID THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT BREACH THE PLEA AGREEMENT BY
SEEKING RESTITUTION ON BEHALF OF THE STATE INSURANCE
FUND?
2. DID THE LOWER COURTS ERR IN ORDERING RESTITUTION TO THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND WHERE THE STATE VIOLATED THE PLEA
AGREEMENT BY SUBMITTING THE FUND'S CLAIM TO THE COURT?

7

ARGUMENT

1

Defendant/Appellant, Brittany Acuna, entered into a written plea agreement
with Respondent State of Idaho. She pleaded guilty to a charge of Battery, I.C.
18-903, subject to a number of specific terms and conditions, among them,
obtaining a domestic violence evaluation, attending anger management classes,
AA group participation, twenty days incarceration on the SCHILD (Sheriff's Inmate
Labor Detail) program, or community service, and out of pocket restitution to the
victim, Officer Brown. The plea was accepted on April 4, 2011 by the Hon. Robert
C Naftz, District Judge. Tr 112 et seq. By changing her plea, and agreeing to the
specific terms, she changed her position in reliance on the mutual promises by
the State.
After remand, the State, in contravention of Paragraph 4 of the Agreement,
submitted claims for restitution on behalf the State Insurance Fund, Tr. 26, 28.
Defense Counsel objected.
The recent case of State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 538,261 P3d 819 (App. 2011) is
on point with the facts of this case. In Gomez, the State and Defendant had
reached a plea and sentencing agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Gomez
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entered a plea

guilty. The state thereafter, as here, sought restitution outside

the ambit of the agreement

finding the State had breached the agreement:

"The parties took care to document the agreement in written form and there was
in the written agreement or in discussions on the
no mention of restitution
record surrounding the plea and its terms. The issue was not raised until after
Gomez had entered the plea-at the sentencing hearing during which the state first
made direct reference to the fact that it would be requesting restitution, but did not
indicate the precise amount."
Similarly, in this case, the State did not seek restitution until after Acuna had
entered her plea before Judge Naftz. Based upon the Gomez standard, and the
case law supporting that opinion, it is clear the state breached its agreement with
Acuna.
Brittany Acuna has served her active probationary period, and on February 16,
2012, Judge Clark placed her on "record check" probation, noting that Brittany had
completed the programs and counseling addressed in the plea agreement. Tr.
127 The Defendant has fully performed on her plea agreement with the state.
Because Brittany has fully performed her bargain, and the state has breached,
Appellant asks this Court to apply the remedy set forth in Gomez: vacate Judge
Clark's restitution order ..
"When a plea agreement has been violated by the prosecution, as a remedy the
court may order specific performance of the agreement or may permit the
defendant to withdraw the guilty plea (citations omitted). Here, it is undisputed that
Doe has performed the required community service, written the essay on self
defense, and otherwise complied with the terms of the original judgment, and the
State received the benefit of its bargain. It would therefore be unjust merely to
allow to withdraw his guilty plea and face the possibility of being tried and
resentenced for the same offense. A remedy of specific performance will hold the
State to its agreement, give Doe the terms he bargained for, and bring this case to
an end."

9

2.

While the State breached its plea agreement by seeking restitution for the
Insurance Fund, the lower courts erred in entertaining the question of restitution
outside the parameters of the Agreement, as well ruling that the "non binding"
nature of the original agreement imbued them with authority to pick, choose and
add provisions to an unambiguous plea agreement. Both the magistrate and
district judge expressed the belief they were free to tinker despite the Defendant's
material change of position and performance on the agreement. Acuna submits
such tinkering is an abuse of discretion.
By entertaining, weighing and considering the State's restitution motion, the
lower courts became more than detached sentencing authorities. They became
interveners in the contractual relationship between the parties, adding conditions
and burdens not in the contemplation of the parties when the agreement was
signed .. This was an impermissible ratification of the State's breach and
misconduct.
Judge Clark believed the agreement was superceded by the victim's
Compensation statutes, citing I.C. 19-5304, Restitution Hearing Tr. 5. Judge Naftz,
on the other hand, believed he could pick, choose or remake the agreement
because it was "non-binding." He was free to accept the waiver of rights and guilty
plea, and free to ignore Paragraph 4 governing restitution, Tr. 46 et seq.
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Judge Naftz asserts: "just because a defendant fulfills certain obligations in
a non binding plea agreement does not oblige the sentencing court to then accept
all of the terms of such non-binding agreement." Tr. 54 Four pages earlier at Tr
48, the Court cites a long line of authority on the due process rights of a defendant
in entering into a plea agreement. That analysis is ignored, and the court views a
change of plea as simply fulfilling "certain obligations". In this case, those
"obligations" include the waiver of all constitutionally protected rights, and an
admission of guilt.
Quoting once again from the Gomez opinion:
"Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly recognized that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971),
establishes that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. (citations omitted).We have
recognized that this principle is derived from the Due Process Clause and the
fundamental rule that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be both voluntary and
intelligent. (citations omitted) Thus it is apparent that the breach of a plea
agreement implicates a defendant's constitutional rights such that the first prong of
our fundamental error analysis is satisfied."
The court also refers to the principle in State v. Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 573, that
"restitution is a direct consequence of pleading guilty and therefore, a sentencing
court may not impose restitution upon a defendant who pleaded guilty unless the
defendant was advised of that possibility prior to the entry of the plea."
First, Brittany Acuna was in part induced to change her plea based upon the
limitation of restitution agreed upon by the State in Paragraph 4 of the Plea
Agreement. Changing her plea in reliance on provision is obviously more than
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fulfilling an "obligation." Second, neither Acuna nor her counsel were ever advised
of an Insurance Fund claim for restitution until well after the plea was entered .
The lower courts failed to make a critical distinction between this case and
others involving Idaho Criminal Rule 11 "non-binding" plea agreements. In this
case the state breached its agreement after the change of plea. That breach
occurred by submitting documents to the sentencing court in contravention of
Paragraph 4. Had the State honored its commitment, there would have been no
restitution hearing because the State's attorney would simply have submitted the
claim for the victim's out of pocket expenses not covered by insurance or workers
compensation. In entertaining the Insurance Fund claim, the lower courts ignored
the due process rights of the Defendant.
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CONCLUSION

Because the State breached its plea agreement with the Defendant by
submitting a claim for restitution outside the scope of the Plea Agreement, and
because the Defendant has fully performed her agreement with the State, this
Court should strike the lower court's order of restitution. The claim on behalf of the
State Insurance Fund was only before the lower court due to the breach by the
State. That being so, the issue of the "non-binding plea agreement" is not relevant
to the analysis of this case.

Respectfully submitted this.2C?day of July, 2012
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